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Organizational Institutionalism 
and Sociology: A Reflection 
C.R. Hinings and Pamela S. Tolbert 
In 1991, DiMaggio and Powell observed: 
Institutional theory presents a paradox. 
Institutional analysis is as old as Emile Durkheim's 
exhortation to study 'social facts as things', yet 
sufficiently novel to be preceded by new in much 
of the contemporary literature. (1991: 1) 
We argue that this paradox is, at least in 
part, the result of a long-standing tension in 
sociology between more materialist, interest-
driven explanations of behavior and 
ideational, normative explanations, a tension 
that has often driven oscillating waves of 
sociological theorizing. It underlies many 
classical debates (e.g., between Spencer and 
Durkheim, Weber and Marx, and even 
Parsons and Mills), and the waves of theory 
associated with it have produced a variety of 
'neo-isms', including neo-Marxist as well as 
neo-institutionalist theories. This distinction 
in explanatory approaches is linked to a more 
general theoretical problematic for sociolo-
gists: how to provide a single, coherent 
account of both stable, persisting patterns of 
social behavior, and the breakdown and elim-
ination of what were once deeply-entrenched 
patterns. In this chapter, we examine the his-
tory of these distinctive explanatory 
approaches in sociology, and locate the 
origins of contemporary institutional work 
on organizations within this context. We also 
consider how more recent organizational 
analyses in the tradition of institutional 
theory have been driven by and reflect this 
basic tension. 
It is not surprising that current institution-
alism embodies core theoretical issues within 
sociology: The roots of this approach to 
organizational analysis are firmly planted in 
the discipline. Tracing the intellectual 
genealogy of institutionalism, Scott's list of 
contributing scholars (2001) includes 
Spencer, Sumner, Cooley, Hughes, Marx, 
Durkheim, Weber, Parsons, Mead, Schutz, 
Berger, and Luckmann - a veritable pantheon 
of sociological theorists! Thus, it is almost 
inevitable that the issues addressed by 
institutionalists are, in many ways, those of 
central concern to general sociology. 
Sociology focuses on understanding the 
nature of both the material arrangements and 
the normative systems that characterize 
collectivities, and the influence of these on 
action; this is the same agenda that defines 
and drives institutional analyses of organiza-
tions. Given the relationship between the 
field of sociology as a whole and institutional 
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studies of organizations, and the claim that 
most eminent, historical sociologists are 
forerunners of institutional theory, the time is 
ripe to revisit the origins and evolution of 
institutional theory and to ask the question of 
how far the work of those forebears is truly 
represented in contemporary scholarship. 
And this will inevitably lead to the questions, 
in what ways has institutionalism added to 
the earlier theoretical insights - and in what 
ways may the earlier insights have been lost 
in more contemporary studies? 
THE FORERUNNERS 
The starting point for this discussion has to 
be Dick Scott's (2001) Institutions and 
Organizations as it provides a comprehen-
sive overview of the institutionalist approach 
to organization theory. While Scott identifies 
seminal links between this approach and a 
wide range of theorists, we focus more nar-
rowly on a particular set of the progenitors he 
discusses, ones we see as contributing most 
directly to the contemporary formulation of 
an institutional approach and to the ongoing 
debates within it. Therefore, we will begin by 
examining the work of four major theorists 
as paired sets, Spencer and Durkheim, first, 
and then Marx and Weber. In our view, the 
point-counterpoint relations between these 
theorists offer useful insights into unresolved 
theoretical problems that are embedded in 
much of the development of current institu-
tional theory. Within this context, we will 
consider the four pieces that DiMaggio and 
Powell (1991) label as the initial formula-
tions of institutional theory, namely, Meyer 
and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), Zucker (1977) and Scott and Meyer 
(1983). 
Spencer and Durkheim 
Among the four streams of early sociological 
theorists that Scott considers as foundational 
for institutional theory, the first includes 
the work of Herbert Spencer. Although 
Spencer's work is rarely referenced (and 
probably read even more rarely) by modern 
day sociologists,1 he was generally consid-
ered to be the preeminent sociologist of 
his time (Turner and Beeghley 1981). 
To describe his work as ambitious is to 
seriously understate the case; Spencer's over-
arching goal was to discover the fundamental 
set of principles that defined the functioning 
of physical, biological and social worlds. 
Although the scope of this aim is amusingly 
quaint from a contemporary standpoint, it's 
worth noting that one of his 'laws of the 
cosmos,' that increasing size in any social 
unit is accompanied by increasing differenti-
ation, anticipated a staple finding from much 
later empirical studies of organizations 
(Blau, Heydebrand, and Stauffer, 1966; Hall, 
Clark, Giordano et al., 1967; Pugh, Hickson, 
Hinings, and Turner, 1969). 
In describing the nature of society, 
Spencer argued that social systems are made 
up of a series of subsystems, and that each 
subsystem and its institutionalized structures 
serve distinctive functions for society as a 
whole. As Scott (2001: 9) points out, ideas 
about 'the functional division of social life 
into spheres or arenas - kinship, stratifica-
tion, politics, economics, religion, and so 
on,' have been central to much 
sociological theorizing. As we discuss in 
more depth below, this conception of 
'institutions' - as core, distinguishing, 
societal-level patterns (structures) that char-
acterize one area of social life, and that are 
fundamentally interlocked with each other -
is much broader than the conception often 
implied in more contemporary work 
(although, unfortunately, the latter is no more 
likely to define the concept of institution 
explicitly and clearly than Spencer or other 
early theorists). 
Importantly, as an adherent of utilitarian 
philosophy, Spencer also made the case that 
these structures arose naturally through a 
process of competition and exchange among 
individuals who, in the rational pursuit of 
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their own self-interests, entered into 
contracts that facilitated such pursuit. Thus, 
society was conceived as the nexus of nego-
tiated contracts. Although Spencer did not 
address the issue directly, implicit in his 
utilitarian and evolutionary arguments is the 
notion that when institutionalized arrange-
ments fail to permit the achievement of 
agents' objectives, they are likely to be 
subject to re-evaluation and purposeful 
change. 
Writing in the shadows of the French 
Revolution, Durkheim was also deeply con-
cerned with the question of what forces held 
societies together. Ultimately, he reached 
very different conclusions than Spencer, 
although two distinct responses to this ques-
tion are evident in his work (Collins, 1994: 
188); the later response is most clearly 
opposed to Spencer's arguments. The earlier 
response, focusing on the division of labor 
in society, particularly in industrialized soci-
eties, is somewhat more compatible with a 
materialist, agency-driven view. In this 
instance, Durkheim argued that solidarity 
reflects recognition of interdependencies 
among members of society created by 
specialization. Later work, focusing on what 
Durkheim referred to as 'social facts,' and 
reflecting his increasing rejection of 
Spencer's utilitarian view of society, gives 
much more weight to purely ideational, 
normative forces that serve as constraints on 
individuals' behavior. 
In Rules of the Sociological Method, his 
treatise on the distinctive domain of sociol-
ogy, Durkheim argues, 
When I fulfill my obligations as brother, husband, 
or citizen, when I execute my contracts, I perform 
duties which are defined, externally to myself and 
my acts, in law and in custom. Even if they con-
form to my own sentiments and I feel their reality 
subjectively, such reality is still objective, for I did 
not create them; I merely inherited them through 
my education ... The systems of signs I use to 
express my thought, the system of currency 
I employ to pay my debts, the instruments of 
credit I utilize in my commercial relations, the 
practices followed in my profession, etc., func-
tion independently of my own use of them. 
(1964: 1-2) 
Durkheim's fundamental view of social 
behavior expressed here not only runs 
directly counter to Spencer's emphasis on 
individuals' conscious calculation of how 
best to pursue independent interests, but 
anticipates arguments later offered by Berger 
and Luckmann (1967) concerning the limited 
ability of individuals to shape social arrange-
ments (which they termed 'exteriority'), and 
the coercive power of these arrangements 
over behavior. It is similarly consistent 
with Bourdieu's (1977) concept of habitus. 
The primacy that Durkheim assigned to 
non-calculative sources of behavior was 
highlighted by a pointed rebuttal to Spencer, 
in which he observed that entering into 
contractual relations necessarily requires a 
pre-existing level of trust among society's 
members. Durkheim concluded that such 
trust was produced through collective con-
sciousness, the normative commitment and 
sense of belonging to a social group (Collins 
and Makowsky, 2005: 95-96).2 
Marx and Weber 
As in the comparison of Spencer and 
Durkheim, arguments about the validity and 
usefulness of assumptions about the impor-
tance of conscious choice and self-interested 
motivations in explaining social behavior 
serve as a key point of distinction between 
the sociological theorizing of Karl Marx and 
Max Weber. Marx was, of course, a material-
ist in philosophy and at the heart of his analy-
sis were notions of conflict, power, 
oppression, exploitation and alienation 
between classes. In contrast to Spencer's and 
Durkheim's preoccupation with explaining 
the persistence of social order, Marx focused 
on forces that led to major transformations in 
societies. 
Marx's core argument, that such transfor-
mations were inherent in class relations, was 
predicated on the assumption that individuals 
who shared a common role in the economy -
a class - would ultimately and inevitably rec-
ognize their shared interests and pursue those 
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interests through collective action. Since all 
economies were constituted by, on one hand, 
a class that profited from control of the 
primary means of production and, on the 
other hand, classes that lacked control of key 
productive resources and thus were subject to 
the exploitation of the first, class conflict was 
inevitable. As technologies and other factors 
changed in ways that provided an exploited 
class with opportunities to overthrow the 
existing system of relations, Marx argued, 
their collective action would result in the dis-
solution of the system and the creation of a 
new set of social relations that was consistent 
with the interests of the rising class. 
Thus, although Marx clearly rejected 
Spencer's belief in the benignity and effi-
ciency of market allocation processes, the 
two did share the general conception 
of social actors as driven by self-awareness 
of material interests. 
However, while Marx's analysis was pred-
icated on the assumption that social action 
primarily reflected rational efforts to maxi-
mize material, class-based interests, he did 
recognize that individuals sometimes failed 
to realize their true class interests - i.e., that 
they were subject to false consciousness. 
This concept entails an implicit acknowl-
edgement of the role of cultural forces, belief 
systems and ideologies, in shaping action as 
well. True to materialist logic, though, Marx 
located the origins of such forces in the eco-
nomic interests and material capabilities of 
the dominant class (Collins, 1994). Thus, 
widely-held social beliefs and ideologies 
were deemed to be shaped largely by the 
dominant class, which had the resources to 
influence the production and widespread 
dissemination of ideas that were consonant 
with their interests (and of course, influence 
over state agencies to suppress production 
and dissemination of ideas that lacked such 
consonance). Moreover, he assumed that 
changes in material conditions would 
provide the basis for changes in epiphenom-
ena, such as false consciousness. In capitalist 
systems, increased opportunities for inter-
action among members of the working class, 
in conjunction with the increasing degrada-
tion of work, were considered key forces in 
enabling members of the labor class to recog-
nize their true, shared material interests and 
to collectively act upon these. 
Thus, the key institutions in Marx's analy-
sis are social classes and their relations, and 
his analysis suggests that these institutions 
will be stable as long as the dominant class 
is able to sustain acceptance of general 
ideologies that support them. When condi-
tions changed sufficiently, though, accept-
ance of dominant ideologies was expected 
to break down under the weight of revealed 
interests, and the institutions to be subject 
to challenge and collapse. The previous 
system of class relations would then be 
replaced by new institutions (new classes, 
with new relations of dominance and subor-
dination) that, presumably, were supported 
by new ideologies.3 
Much of Weber's analyses can be seen as a 
response to Marx's emphasis on material 
interests, and particularly on class relations, 
as the driving force in social action. Along 
with Spencer, Marx and Durkheim, Weber 
was concerned with large-scale social 
changes that he saw taking place, changes 
that were reshaping the whole nature of 
society. Although some have argued that his 
analyses directly opposed those of Marx, by 
prioritizing ideas and cultural forces as deter-
minants of social action (Parsons, 1937), 
most contemporary theorists view his aims 
more in terms of tempering, rather than 
rejecting Marx's arguments (Turner and 
Beeghley, 1981; Collins, 1994; Swedberg, 
1998): his approach to explaining social 
phenomena emphasizes the interaction 
between material conditions and interests, on 
one hand, and subjective interpretations and 
meanings on the other (Weber, 1949). Thus, 
neither material nor ideational forces are 
privileged in his explanations of social 
phenomena; rather these forces must be 
understood as independent though inter-
twined phenomena. 
It is, however, his work on cultural influ-
ences and belief systems that is most clearly 
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reflected in at least early formulations of 
institutional analyses of organizations. As 
Scott (2001: 13) puts it: 
'more contemporary analysts of institutions lay 
claim to Weber as the guiding genius than to any 
other early theorist. Although Weber did not 
explicitly employ the concept of institution, his 
work is permeated with a concern for understand-
ing the ways in which cultural rules, ranging in 
nature from customary mores to legally defined 
constitutions or rule systems, define social struc-
tures and govern social behavior' 
In particular, Weber's analysis of the nature 
of rational-legal authority and its critical role 
in the operation of contemporary organiza-
tions provided a key point of departure for the 
foundational work in institutional studies 
offered by Zucker (1977) and Meyer and 
Rowan (1977). Arguing that different forms 
of organizations (e.g., patrimonial adminis-
tration, charismatic communes, bureaucracy) 
rest fundamentally on different beliefs about 
the 'true' or 'proper' nature of social rela-
tions, Weber sought to delineate key features 
of rational-legal authority, a belief system 
underpinning the bureaucratic form. 
Rational-legal authority entails acceptance of 
social relations as rightly governed by formal 
laws and regulations which, in turn, are pre-
sumed to be based on rational calculations of 
the most effective means to attain given ends. 
In this context, obedience is given to persons 
based on the formal offices they hold, in part 
because their attainment of office is under-
stood to indicate possession of skills and abil-
ities that make them able to execute the tasks 
of the office. Weber contrasted this form with 
traditional authority, in which social arrange-
ments are accepted as preordained, whether 
by a deity or natural law, and charismatic 
authority, in which accepted social arrange-
ments reflect the dictates of an individual 
who is viewed as possessing supernatural or 
magical powers and abilities (Weber, 1947). 
This conception of rational-legal authority 
as a cultural foundation for modern organiza-
tions was linked, particularly in Meyer and 
Rowan's and Zucker's initial analyses of 
organizational institutions, to work in the 
tradition of phenomenology, as articulated by 
Schutz (1967) and Berger and Luckmann 
(1967). As suggested in our discussion 
above, such phenomenological explanations 
of social behavior have close parallels to 
those of Durkheim. For Durkheim, though, 
institutions - the forces that produced 'social 
facts' or enduring patterns of behavior char-
acterizing collectivities - were primarily nor-
mative, operating through the social 
solidarity that bound individuals together in a 
society (Durkheim, 1947). For phenomenol-
ogists, on the other hand, institutions were 
defined more in cognitive terms, as shared 
meanings and understandings that arose from 
social interaction and shaped behavior 
largely by constraining individuals' cogni-
tions and perceived choices of action. A phe-
nomenological approach to institutions can 
also be distinguished from Durkheim's by 
the concern of phenomenologists with expli-
cating the micro-interactional processes in 
which institutions originate. 
THE INITIAL FORMULATIONS 
OF INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSES 
OF ORGANIZATIONS 
In terms of contemporary institutional analy-
ses, Powell and DiMaggio (1991) have four 
articles that they call 'The Initial 
Formulations,' namely, Meyer and Rowan 
(1977), Zucker (1977), DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) and Scott and Meyer (1983). 
These expositions show continuity with 
the forerunners, but also a distinct break. The 
continuity involves theoretical notions of the 
bases of social action; the break involves a 
specific focus on organizations. 
To appreciate, in part, the 'neo-' label that 
is often attached to this tradition, it is useful 
to recall the dominant lines of sociological 
theorizing and research on organizations 
up to the mid-1970s.4 In the U.S., research on 
organizations as a distinct subfield of study 
by sociologists had its roots in efforts 
by Robert Merton and his students 
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(e.g., Merton, 1947a; Gouldner, 1954; Blau, 
1955) to empirically examine key tenets of 
functionalist theory. Based on the notion that 
organizations could be viewed as societies in 
miniature, organizational research was seen as 
permitting the kind of comparative study 
needed to provide systematic validation for 
functionalist arguments (and thus represented 
a very appealing alternative to conducting 
costly and difficult cross-national studies). 
The logic of functionalist reasoning 
encouraged examining and explaining organi-
zational structures in terms of benefits (par-
ticularly in terms of efficient functioning)to 
organizations. Thus, by the mid-1970s, the 
most prominent line of sociological research 
on organizations, which had come to be 
dubbed as 'contingency theory,' reflected a 
confluence of this theoretical agenda and the 
more pragmatic concerns of a tradition 
known as acirninistrative theory (Gulick and 
Urwick, 1937; Follett, 1942). Studies in this 
tradition typically investigated the way in 
which various contingencies, such as size and 
technology, affected the relative efficiency 
and profitability of variations in structure, 
such as complexity, formalization, centraliza-
tion; that is, organizations were generally 
assumed to adopt structural arrangements on 
the basis of calculations that were aimed at 
enhancing efficiency and effectiveness, and 
that took into account various contingencies 
facing the organization (e.g., Woodward, 
1958; Hage and Aiken, 1967; Pugh et al., 
1969; Klatzky, 1970; Blau and Schoenherr, 
1971; Pennings, 1973). As Meyer and Rowan 
summarize the literature at this point in time: 
One of the central problems in organization theory 
is to describe the conditions that give rise to 
rationalized formal structure. In conventional 
theories, rational formal structure is assumed to be 
the most effective way to coordinate and control 
the complex relationship networks involved in 
modern technical or work activities. (1977: 342) 
Meyer and Rowan 
In advancing an alternative view of the 
sources of organizational structure, Meyer 
and Rowan drew on Weber's analysis of 
rational-legal authority in modern 
economies, and wove this together with 
Berger and Luckmann's (1967) ideas about 
institutionalization, processes leading to the 
kind of socially-constructed reality depicted 
in the earlier quote from Durkheim. They 
argued that in modern societies, rules about 
how organizations 'ought' to operate and the 
kinds of structures they 'should' have arisen 
from a variety of sources. Among these, 
Meyer and Rowan discuss the effects of com-
plex relational networks (interconnections 
among organizations that facilitate the spread 
of ideas and understandings), the collective 
organization of the environment (the rise of 
powerful states that can pass and enforce 
mandates that affect organizations), and the 
leadership of local organizations (non-gov-
ernment organizations that have power 
and/or legitimacy to promote prescribed 
organizational arrangements). Organizations 
experience pressure to conform to these rules 
in order to maintain their own legitimacy; 
thus, formal structure, Meyer and Rowan 
suggest, can be viewed as the result of 
conformity to such rules or 'myths.' 
This emphasis on ideational and normative 
sources of structure offered a very sharp con-
trast to the then-dominant approach to 
explaining organizational structure. Note 
here that, in contrast to earlier sociological 
analyses that provided the underpinning for 
their arguments, their concept of 'institution' 
entailed much more circumscribed social 
phenomena - particular social rules and 
definitions of the appropriate formal struc-
ture of organizations.5 
Zucker 
Published in the same year, Zucker's analysis 
(1977) provided an elaboration of the phe-
nomenological arguments contained in 
Meyer and Rowan, along with empirical 
evidence for these from an experimental 
study. In contrast to the largely macro-level 
focus of the other foundational work, Zucker 
ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND SOCIOLOGY: A REFLECTION 479 
addressed the microfoundations of institu-
tions in some detail and, as she herself says, 
such an approach 'focuses upon institutional-
ization as a process rather than as a state; 
upon the cognitive processes involved in the 
creation and transmission of institutions' 
(Zucker, 1977: 104; see also her post-script 
to the re-printing of this study in Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991). Her experiments demon-
strated that when subjects were directed to 
think of themselves as being in an organiza-
tional setting (rather than simply engaged in 
informal interaction with other participants) 
they were much more willing to accept the 
judgments of others; moreover, in organiza-
tional settings, such judgments were 
more readily transmitted from one set of 
subjects to a new set - across generations of 
participants. 
Consistent with Weber's arguments about 
rational-legal authority, then, her research 
indicated that individuals are inclined to view 
the behavior of representatives of organiza-
tions as being relatively objective (presum-
ably, as reflecting rational decision criteria 
rather than individual, idiosyncratic choices), 
and that this increases their propensity to 
transmit these behaviors to others as rules, 
'correct' ways of doing things. Her work 
thus provided a crucial link between phe-
nomenologists' arguments about the impact 
of institutions on individual cognitions and 
behavior and Weberian arguments about the 
nature of authority and normative order in 
modern societies. This, in turn, provided a 
key base for research by later institutionalists 
on the diffusion of particular structures and 
practices across sets of organizations 
(Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Palmer, Jennings 
and Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1993; Skinner and 
Staiger, 2005). 
DiMaggio and Powell 
In part, the positive reception that greeted 
Meyer and Rowan's and Zucker's papers 
reflected recognition of the absence of 
more normative views of behavior found in 
dominant lines of organizational research at 
the time. By the early 1980s, however, con-
cerns about a perceived overemphasis on 
normative imagery in this work and an 
implicit lack of agency had begun to build 
(Perrow, 1985; Oliver, 1991, 1992; Abbott, 
1992; Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997). 
These issues were addressed, to some extent, 
in the other two foundational pieces, 
published in 1983 by DiMaggio and Powell, 
and by Scott and Meyer. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) also start 
from a Weberian view of rationalism as the 
major force in industrializing and moderniz-
ing societies, and echo Weber's idea of such 
rationalism becoming an 'iron cage.' 
However, their purpose is to use this as a 
springboard for suggesting that the processes 
of rationalization and bureaucratization that 
drove Weber's analysis are now standard in 
modern society. Like Meyer and Rowan and 
Zucker, they argue that the creation of insti-
tutional templates serves to drive processes 
of isomorphism, thus resulting in a high level 
of structural homogeneity among organiza-
tions. Their specification of different sources 
of isomorphism - mimetic, normative and 
coercive - elaborated and clarified distinc-
tions pointed to in Meyer and Rowan's work. 
Perhaps more importantly, their notion of 
organizational field helped to draw attention 
to the array of interacting organizations that 
give rise to, shape and re-shape institutional-
ized definitions. They define a field as (1983: 
148), 'those organizations that, in the 
aggregate, constitute a recognized area of 
institutional life: key suppliers, resource and 
product consumers, regulatory agencies and 
other organizations that produce the services 
or products.' 
The notion of field serves to highlight the 
variety of actors that may engage in efforts to 
affect institutional definitions, and implicitly 
suggests a role for active agency, at least 
during early phases of field stracturation, 
while still recognizing the constraining 
effects of such definitions. They posit, 
'(O)rganizational actors making rational 
decisions construct around themselves an 
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environment that constrains their ability to 
change further in later years' (1983: 148). 
This conceptualization foreshadows 
DiMaggio's (1988) later work elaborating on 
the role of institutional entrepreneurs in 
change processes. It also reflects research by 
Tolbert and Zucker (1983), who examined 
how the political conflict and struggles 
among elites and immigrants that contributed 
to the early formulation and adoption of civil 
service reform laws became an increasingly 
irrelevant factor in predicting adoption of the 
reform over time. Thus, DiMaggio and 
Powell's analysis provides one avenue for 
integrating the agentic, interest-driven 
images of social behavior offered by Spencer 
and Marx, with the more constrained, 
normative conceptions of Durkheim. Like 
Weber's work, their arguments recognize 
the validity and necessity of both approaches 
for adequate sociological explanations. 
Scott and Meyer 
Scott and Meyer (1983) elaborate a similar 
notion to that of field, namely, societal sector. 
They use this term in two ways. The first 
usage denotes the set of organizations that 
provide similar products and services and 
serve the same function, along with resource-
providing and regulatory organizations; this 
is clearly akin to DiMaggio and Powell's 
notion of a field. In a second use, though, 
sector is used to refer to the kinds of per-
formance criteria that are typically used in 
evaluating different sets of organizations. In 
particular, they distinguish between technical 
sectors, in which performance evaluation is 
largely identified with market outcomes, and 
institutional sectors, in which performance 
evaluation is closely linked to conformity 
with institutional rules and regulations and 
only indirectly tied to market outcomes. This 
latter concept of sector represents a different 
way of integrating both agentic and norma-
tive approaches to explaining organizations' 
behavior, suggesting that the relevance of 
more agentic or normative explanations 
depends on the context in which an organiza-
tion operates. 
Both of the analyses by DiMaggio and 
Powell and Scott and Meyer thus partially 
address the core question that Tolbert and 
Zucker (1996) later articulated as a key prob-
lematic for the further development of an 
institutional approach, reconciling what they 
refer to as rational actor models of behavior 
with institutional models. They note: 
We suggest that these two general models should 
be treated not as oppositional but rather as 
representing two ends of a continuum of decision-
making processes and behaviors. Thus, a key 
problem for theory and research is to specify 
the conditions under which behavior is more likely 
to resemble one end of this continuum or the 
other. In short, what is needed are theories of 
when rationality is likely to be more or less 
bounded. (176) 
Although recent organizational analyses 
cast in the institutional tradition have 
made some progress in addressing this 
issue, a fully satisfactory resolution 
still awaits. There are other issues that 
remain to be addressed as well, as discussed 
below. 
ISSUES FOR INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Comparison of the work of the classic 
theoretical forerunners and the initial formu-
lations of institutional theory suggests at 
least three issues that merit much more atten-
tion by contemporary institutional theory. 
These are: 
1. Integrating conceptions of interest-driven behav-
ior (and hence, problems of power and conflict) 
with those of bounded rationality and norma-
tively-guided behavior; 
2. Setting organizational institutionalism in wider 
historical and social contexts in order to 
understand more profound processes of social 
change; 
3. Taking an interpretive approach seriously. 
These issues are not, of course, orthogo-
nal; there is clearly overlap among them. 
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Incorporating issues of power 
and conflict 
For both Weber and Marx, the idea of an 
institution was inseparable from issues of 
power and interest. For both, understanding 
the emergence, functioning and change in 
institutions entailed understanding the ability 
of particular groups in society to ensure that 
their interests were served by given arrange-
ments. For both, processes of legitimization 
were seen as key to sustaining institutions. 
And for both, analyses of patterns of power, 
domination, and conflict required in-depth 
understanding of the social and historical 
context in which they occurred. 
Weber argued that the dominance of 
bureaucracy as an institution in societies 
characterized by rational-legal authority 
reflected its substantial advantages over 
alternative forms of organization (1947: 
337): 'It is superior to any other form in pre-
cision, in stability, in the stringency of its dis-
cipline, and in its reliability ... superior both 
in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its 
operations, and is formally capable of appli-
cation to all kinds of administrative tasks.' 
He also clearly recognized the dark side of 
this advantage, however, noting that an 
entrenched bureaucracy can serve any inter-
ests, and that those whose interests are served 
are likely to become increasingly remote 
from the mass of the population. Weber's 
imagery of members of bureaucratic organi-
zations as cogs in a machine acknowledges 
that the institution can be a source of alien-
ation, not only in the psychological sense but 
in the more Marxian sense: individuals are 
separated from the products of their labor, 
and thus may enact behaviors that run 
directly counter to their material interests. 
Marx's notion of false consciousness cap-
tures the same sort of phenomenon. Although 
contemporary institutional theory would 
seem a natural point of departure for examin-
ing such behavior, work in this tradition has 
given surprisingly little attention to it. 
As Friedland and Alford argued that the 
social sciences have been in a theoretical 
retreat from society, so it is possible to argue 
that organizational institutionalism has been 
in a theoretical retreat from issues of inter-
ests, power, conflict, domination and 
exploitation. In part, this reflects both an 
unstated functionalist logic in an institution-
alist approach (Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd, 
2005), and a general lack of concern with 
these issues in North American organiza-
tional theory and sociology in general 
(Hinings and Greenwood, 2002). With few 
exceptions, there has been a little recognition 
of class or collective interests and power in 
institutional analyses. Although DiMaggio 
(1988) addresses the issues of interests and 
power, his analysis reflects more of a concern 
for connecting institutional arguments with 
the notion of individual agency (more in line 
with Spencer's concerns) than for under-
standing how particular groups attempt to 
dominate others. Greenwood and Hinings 
(1996) do have a notion of particular occupa-
tional and functional groups having different 
material interests and vying for the power to 
impose their institutional arrangements on 
others. Lawrence et al (2001) propose that 
influence, force, discipline and domination 
are all mechanisms of institutional change 
that are based on how power is used. 
However, in these approaches the empha-
sis is on the ways in which power is utilized 
to allow institutional change to occur. That is, 
it is primarily conceptualized as a factor or 
condition that allows change at either the 
field or organizational level. And in spite of 
the language that Lawrence et al. (2001) use, 
their concern is not with the ability of partic-
ular groups to frame institutional arrange-
ments in such a way that their interests are 
furthered. What is needed is not only a more 
elaborate exploration of the role of institu-
tional forms, organizations and processes as 
frameworks and mechanisms in serving 
some interests rather than others and, poten-
tially, bolstering the power of some social 
and occupational groups rather than others, 
but also an examination of the conditions 
under which disadvantaged groups will 
simply accept or recognize and challenge 
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existing institutions. Interestingly, Selznick 
(1949) dealt with some of these issues in his 
work on Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 
but this aspect has not been taken up. 
One interesting development that could 
form the basis for such an approach is the 
idea of institutional logics (see Thornton and 
Ocasio, Chapter 3 this volume). Marx 
emphasized the basis of ideologies in inter-
ests and the consequent way in which such 
ideologies control social relations. Thornton 
and Ocasio (1999: 804) defined institutional 
logics as 'the socially constructed, historical 
patterns of material practices, assumptions, 
values, beliefs, and rules by which individu-
als produce and reproduce their material sub-
sistence, organize time and space, and 
provide meaning to their social reality.' And 
as they point out in this volume, there is an 
inescapably material aspect to institutional 
logics. However, the nature of logics as 
ideologies and the ways in which they are 
related to interests has not been fully 
explored. 
There is, of course, a stream of sociologi-
cal and management theory that takes institu-
tional frameworks as embodiments of power, 
control and domination, namely, critical 
theory (Habermas, 1970, 1971, 1974; 
Alvesson and Willmott, 1992; Alvesson and 
Deetz, 1996). However, this stream of 
theorizing has had little of no impact on 
organizational institutionalism. More recent 
efforts to join research on social movements 
with institutional analyses also partially 
addresses this issue, but the problem 
with much of this work is that it implicitly 
takes for granted the ability of actors to 
rationally assess the impact of existing 
arrangements on their own interests, and 
challenge those that fail to serve these 
interests (e.g., Schneiberg and Bartley, 2001; 
Ingram and Rao, 2004; Rojas, 2006). 
Hence, they often rest on a more Spencerian 
view of social action, and fail to effectively 
address the insights of Durkheim and more 
recent phenomenologists concerning the 
power of normative orders in constraining 
action. 
Thus, overall, sociological forerunners 
point organizational institutionalists in quite 
different directions than have been taken so 
far. The central issues that require explo-
ration include the way in which institutional 
arrangements serve as instruments of domi-
nation by particular groups and particular 
sets of interests rather than others, and better 
specification of the conditions under which 
they are likely to be subject to challenge by 
competing interests. An important part of the 
Marxist, Weberian and critical theory argu-
ments about institutions is the way in which 
forms move across institutional arenas pre-
cisely because of the way in which they sup-
port particular interests and allow elites to 
maintain power (cf. Prichard and Willmott, 
1997). As Hinings and Greenwood argued 
(2002), organizational theorists have to be 
more concerned with the implications of 
organizational forms and processes for 
power and control, something that should 
resonate strongly for organizational institu-
tionalists because institutions are the durable, 
change-resistant social structures of society 
(Scott, 2001: 49). As Giddens (1984: 24) 
puts it, 'Institutions by definition are the 
more enduring features of social life .... 
giving "solidity" (to social systems) across 
time and space.' 
Understanding the relation 
between institutions and 
social change 
As noted, the use of the concept of 'institu-
tion' by contemporary organizational 
researchers has generally involved a much 
more specific and narrower referent than that 
of classic sociological theory. Arising as an 
alternative approach to explaining formal 
organizational structure, the earliest exposi-
tions of institutionalism associated this 
concept with very specific elements of struc-
ture among a set of organizations: e.g., affir-
mative action offices, civil service rales, 
radio programming formats, 'poison pill' 
policies, and so forth. One result of this 
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approach was the deflection of efforts to con-
ceptualize formal structure in terms of 
broadly defined dimensions, such as com-
plexity, formalization, and centralization, 
efforts that dominated much of organiza-
tional sociology from the 1950s through the 
1970s. Indeed, the lack of success by sociol-
ogists in coming up with agreed-upon con-
ceptualizations and operationalizations of 
such broad dimensions (e.g., Kimberly, 
1976) may have contributed to researchers' 
receptivity to an institutional approach. 
Another, and perhaps more consequential 
outcome, however, has been a neglect of the 
sorts of broad patterns of social relations and 
social change that were traditionally associ-
ated with analyses of institutions (for notable 
exceptions, see the work of John Meyer and 
his colleagues). That is, there has been a 
distinct shift from efforts to understand 'big 
institutions' to those that are focused on 
(relatively) 'little institutions.' 
The redefinition of the concept of institu-
tion to denote specific elements of structure 
may have been driven in part by empiricist 
concerns. The broad conception of institution 
in sociological theory did not lend itself 
easily to operationalization or efforts to 
verify theoretical claims, as witnessed by 
the still-ongoing debates over how to define 
and measure 'class' (e.g., Erickson and 
Goldfhorpe, 1992; Wright, 1997; Weeden 
and Grusky, 2005). The redefinition may also 
reflect that fact that many (most?) of the cur-
rent proponents of institutionalism work in 
business schools, a context that is apt to 
encourage a stronger focus on explaining the 
behavior of organizations per se and dis-
courage a broader focus on general societal 
issues and processes of social change 
(Stern and Barley, 1996). One might argue, 
as this volume as a whole does, that institu-
tional theory has told us a great deal about 
organizational behavior. Indeed, the exis-
tence of a 'Handbook of Organizational 
Institutionalism' is testament to this. 
However, as a consequence of the narrow-
ness of its conception of institutions, institu-
tional theory has offered little in return to the 
rich heritage of sociological theorizing from 
which it draws (cf. Hinings, 1988; Hinings 
and Greenwood, 2002). 
Most of the theorists that Scott labels fore-
runners were concerned with the broad 
sweep of institutions - how society was 
constituted through its institutional frame-
work, and how that framework was chang-
ing. Their analyses dealt with creation and 
change in dominant institutions, and under-
standing both the historical causes and con-
sequences of such change for both society 
and individuals. These issues particularly 
resonate in the work of Marx, Durkheim and 
Weber. Conceptually, a strong distinguishing 
feature of the work of Weber and Marx, espe-
cially, was an emphasis on understanding 
institutions and institutional change within 
broad historical contexts. They recognized 
that they lived in times of large-scale social 
change and upheaval, and struggled to under-
stand them. For them, all analysis was 
historically located in a particular socio-
economic milieu. While all three were highly 
analytical (e.g., the use of ideal types, the 
labor theory of value, the nature of anomie), 
such constructs were only possible because 
of both sweeping and detailed scholarship of 
the historical trajectories and embedded 
nature of institutions. 
It is not that contemporary institutionalists 
are oblivious to the historical settings that 
frame the diffusion of specific practices (e.g., 
see Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Sine, Haveman, 
and Tolbert, 2005; Haveman, Rao, and 
Paruchuri, 2006), but that concern with 
explaining organizational behavior, per se, 
has often led to a lack of concern with under-
standing and explaining overarching shifts in 
society - the increased formalism in all kinds 
of organizations (though see Drori, Jang, and 
Meyer, 2006), the rise of international gover-
nance organizations in the wake of globaliza-
tion, such as the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, and International 
Labour Organization, that are not subject to 
the authority of any given nation state, the 
increasing levels of stratification in many 
societies resulting, in part, from changing 
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organizational employment policies, and so 
forth - and the implications of such shifts for 
individuals and social order. 
Work focusing on the field level of analy-
sis, which Scott (2006: 16) defines as 'a set 
of interdependent populations of organiza-
tions participating in the same cultural and 
social sub-system,' provides a potential pur-
chase on this issue. This level has indeed 
become important in the last 10-15 years in 
institutional theory, and is intermediate 
between organizations and wider social 
systems and forces. However, organizational 
institutionalists need to do more work that 
locates fields in a societal (and perhaps 
international) context. This is particularly 
important if organizational theorists and 
sociologists of organizations believe, with 
Weber, that organizations are the key institu-
tional forms of society. We need to address 
questions concerning the ways in which 
organizations both shape and are shaped by 
the larger historical contexts in which they 
are located. 
There are, of course, some exemplars that 
deal with understanding the relation between 
organizational and societal change, in partic-
ular, Zucker (1983), Fligstein (1990), Dobbin 
(1994) and in a different way, Orru, Biggart, 
and Hamilton (1991). It's also worth noting 
that Friedland and Alford's cri de coeur con-
cerning the retreat from society is not appli-
cable in Europe, where the development of 
institutional theory has been strongly located 
in differences between nation states and vari-
eties of capitalism (Whitley, 1992; Morgan, 
2001; Djelic and Sahlin Andersson, 2006). 
Much of organizational institutionalism, 
though, needs to find its way back to these 
issues of historical and societal significance. 
Taking an interpretive approach 
seriously 
The final set of problems that we see as need-
ing more attention by organizational institu-
tionalists involves gaining a better 
understanding of the kinds of issues that 
underpinned Durkheim's analysis - how nor-
mative orders arise, are maintained and 
change. That is, institutionalism needs to 
explore in more detail the conditions under 
which individuals are likely to raise and 
accept challenges to existing institutional 
orders, or to reject such challenges. This 
problem also, clearly, relates to Marx's 
notion of false consciousness, and the ques-
tion of how Klasse an sich may become 
Klassefeur sich. 
As noted, institutionalists have addressed 
these concerns to some extent, particularly 
by drawing on work by phenomenologists, 
such as Schutz, Berger and Luckmann, 
and by more recent scholars, such as 
Bourdieu and Giddens. Giddens' notion of 
the 'duality of structure,' suggesting that 
while structures constrain social action they 
are also created and modified by knowledge-
able actors, has served as an important 
springboard for much discussion of the 
processes of institutional change (1976, 
1979). For the most part, however, analyses 
that have drawn on the ideas of these schol-
ars have remained theoretical (see Sewell, 
1992 for a particularly cogent theoretical 
synthesis). The great majority of empirical 
studies conducted under the banner of insti-
tutionalism have involved large-scale, quan-
titative studies examining the adoption or, 
less frequently, the abandonment of particu-
lar organizational practices or arrangements. 
While these studies are often premised on 
theoretical assumptions about cognitive and 
interactive processes that underpin these 
institutional processes (DiMaggio, 1997; 
Oliver, 1991; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996; 
Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Greenwood, 
Suddaby, and Hinings, 2002), the 
assumptions themselves have seldom been 
subject to empirical verification by 
researchers.6 
One approach to this entails more inten-
sive use of data gathered through observa-
tional, interview and analysis of historical 
documents derived from first-hand partici-
pants involved in change or potential change 
processes. This is in line with Silverman's 
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(1970) older agenda for organizational soci-
ology, centering on a critique of reified and 
abstracted empiricism and arguing for its 
replacement with an action frame of refer-
ence. Silverman was particularly concerned 
with shifting attention to what organizational 
actors actually do through the process of 
interpretation to construct meanings. In 
terms of method, this approach promotes the 
use of case studies, focuses on actual behav-
iors, privileges discourse and emphasizes 
metaphor. In a similar vein, Barley and 
Tolbert have sought to lay out a research 
agenda, specifically within the framework of 
institutional theory, which addresses issues 
of action and institutional change, and which 
emphasizes the identification and analysis of 
scripts centered on behavior as a key ele-
ment. Drawing on Giddens' concepts of 
structuration, they make a plea for 'a system-
atic exploration of the relative important of 
behavioral and interpretive phenomena in 
the institutional process, and on the basis of 
such exploration, the fashioning of a set of 
methods that are sensitive to and systematic 
about documenting both cultural and struc-
tural dynamics' (Barley and Tolbert, 1997: 
113). One example of empirical work in this 
vein is Barley's (1986) classic study of the 
adoption of new technology by radiology 
departments, which analyzes changes pro-
duced in scripts, routines, and processes of 
structuration (see Scott's 2001 of this study). 
An alternative approach involves linking 
discourse theory and concepts of framing 
with institutional theory (Phillips, Lawrence, 
and Hardy, 2004; Chreim, 2006). As with the 
attempt to use structuration theory, the con-
cern here is with the processes of institution-
alization and actors as active agents 
interpreting and establishing meanings in 
those processes. Phillips et al. (2004) develop 
a discursive model of institutionalization that 
highlights the relationships among texts, dis-
course, institutions, and action. They argue 
that language is fundamental to institution-
alization: institutionalization occurs as actors 
interact and come to accept shared definitions of 
reality, and it is through linguistic processes that 
definitions of reality are constituted (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966). Despite this connection 
between institutions and language, most institu-
tional theory has been dominated by realist inves-
tigations in which the examination of 
organizational practices has been disconnected 
from the discursive practices that constitute them 
(Phillips et al., 2004: 636). 
One of the few examples of an empirical 
study using a discourse analytic approach to 
study institutional phenomena is represented 
in Zbaracki's (1998) thoughtful and provoca-
tive analysis of the adoption and implemen-
tation of total quality management practices 
by organizations. 
The essential point about an interpretative 
approach is that it takes the actor, subjectivity, 
meanings, and reflexivity seriously. In so 
doing it opens up the black box of institution-
alization both in stability and change. And it 
does it from a theoretical and methodological 
standpoint that is less than prevalent in orga-
nizational institutionalism. While we have 
many provocative suggestions as to factors 
that enable actors to question and alter extant 
institutions (see Sewell, 1992), we have little 
empirical knowledge of the conditions under 
which those factors are most likely to come 
into play. Thus, many questions remain 
answered, including those such as: What is 
required for a general reorientation of shared 
cognitions (e.g., under what conditions might 
a widespread rejection of tenure systems in 
academia occur)? What causes breakdowns in 
institutionalization processes, once these are 
set in motion (e.g., why did some developed 
countries resist signing the Kyoto protocols 
after many of their allies and partners had 
done so)? And why do institutions that clearly 
disadvantage some groups continue to be 
accepted by members of those groups (e.g., 
why did some freed slaves in the antebellum 
U.S. become slaveholders themselves)? 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
We have attempted to revisit the origins of 
institutional theory and thereby ask questions 
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concerning in what ways the earlier insights 
may have been lost in more contemporary 
studies. 
Contemporary institutional theory reflects 
the core understandings and assumptions that 
provided touchstones for classic sociological 
theorizing, as well as the analytic dilemmas 
that characterize the combined works of its 
forerunners. By tracing its linkages to the 
ideas and arguments of the preeminent social 
theorists indicated by Scott, we have 
intended to help explain both the attraction of 
this approach to organizational analysis for 
many researchers, as well as the difficult and 
ongoing debates that have sometimes fueled 
a general sense of uneasiness about its future. 
We have argued that, in particular, current 
institutionalism is characterized by a core 
tension that can be traced to the roots of soci-
ology, understanding social action as a prod-
uct of interest-motivated, conscious choices 
by actors or as a product of normatively-
constrained, habitualized responses. In line 
with the observations of Tolbert and Zucker 
(1996) and others, we do not see these as 
antithetical models, but rather as poles on a 
continuum: Under different conditions, 
actors' decisions and behaviors are likely to 
be closer to one or the other end of the spec-
trum. In our view, the key problematic facing 
sociologists (and anyone who seeks to extend 
an institutionalist perspective) is specifying 
what these conditions are, and explaining the 
connection between particular conditions 
and individuals' receptivity to cognitive 
reorientation and norm-breaking action. 
As argued above, we believe that part of 
this effort will require more empirical 
analyses that use interpretive frameworks to 
explore institutional phenomena. That is, we 
need a much more thorough understanding of 
institutions as manifested in individual 
perceptions and decisions if we are to fully 
grasp the duality of structures (using 
Giddens' term). It is commonly argued, for 
example, that resource constraints that hinder 
the enactment of institutionally-based behav-
iors are often a critical factor in bringing 
about institutional change (e.g., Leblebici, 
Salancik, Copay, and King, 1991; Sewell, 
1992; Barley and Tolbert, 1997). But we 
have little insight into how individuals trans-
late resource problems into a critical 
consciousness, or into what determines 
whether such constraints will lead merely to 
minor adaptations or to complete rejection of 
institutional patterns. Gaining a better 
understanding of such issues would, we 
speculate, ultimately provide the foundation 
for a better understanding of the sorts of 
broad changes in societies and social orders 
that motivated the sociological analyses that 
serve as the forerunners of contemporary 
institutionalism, and could also help 
illuminate the way in which existing rela-
tions of power are likely to be subject to chal-
lenge. Drawing a link between specific 
micro-level interactional processes and 
particular instances of broad social change is 
a treacherous business, one that has some 
resemblance to exploring the butterfly effect 
(Bradbury, 1953), but a general understand-
ing of micro-level phenomena would, we 
believe, allow a fuller understanding of how 
individual processes and societal level 
outcomes may be generally linked. 
In addition, a central motif of the social 
theorizing that institutional theory draws 
upon was of the processes of social change. 
While it is necessary to conceptualize institu-
tionalization as a state, there has been too 
much emphasis on this rather than on institu-
tionalization as a process, understanding how 
those processes occur over time, and 
what the central drivers of institutional 
change are. These kinds of questions were at 
the heart of the theorizing of Durkheim, 
Marx and Weber (and are also exempli-
fied in the work of Meyer and his col-
leagues. They are much less evident in the 
work of contemporary organizational 
institutionalists. 
We believe that following up on these 
themes in our research agendas would 
allow modern institutionalism to make 
a significant contribution to the 
rich sociological heritage on which it has 
drawn. 
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NOTES 
1 This lack of attention is summed up by Parsons' 
plaintive query, posed in the opening of The 
Structure of Social Action, less than 40 years after 
Spencer's death (1937: 1): 'Who now reads 
Spencer?' Recent theorists (e.g., Andreski, 1973; 
Turner and Beeghley, 1981) suggest that the general 
neglect of useful theoretical insights provided by 
Spencer stems from antipathy toward his embrace of 
now-discounted ideas, such as Social Darwinism. 
2 Interestingly, some empirical evidence of 
Durkheim's notion of collective consciousness can be 
adduced from recent work by psychologists on the 
formation and behavior of in-groups (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979). In a provocative analysis, Zucker 
(1986) offers a reversal of Durkheim's arguments, 
noting that institutions can contribute to the forma-
tion of trust and solidarity. 
3 very similar argument is advanced by Merton 
(1947b), who focuses on the relative balance of func-
tions and dysfunctions associated with existing struc-
tures as a source of social change. Merton does not 
invoke notions of objectively-defined classes, how-
ever, and though he recognizes that it is important to 
consider for whom (or for which groups) a given 
structure is functional or dysfunctional, how to factor 
that consideration into assessments of the likelihood 
of change is left unanswered. 
4 For a slightly more expanded account of the ori-
gins of an institutional approach in organizational 
analyses, see Tolbert and Zucker, 1996. 
5 A slightly different, but also relatively narrow 
notion of institution is found in Selznick's work on 
leadership (1957: 16-17). One of the functions of a 
leader, Selznick argues, is to infuse an organization 
with social value that goes beyond the achievement 
of its technical goals; this contributes to its 
adaptability and long-term survival. Thus, Selznicks 
use here identifies 'institution' with a type of 
organization. 
6 Some relevant empirical work that relates to 
this has been provided over the last 20 years by psy-
chologists in research on processes of cognition for-
mation and change, but the use of such research by 
sociologists or others drawing on institutional theory, 
even as evidential support for underlying assump-
tions, is very rare (see DiMaggio, 1997; Clemens and 
Cooke, 1999). 
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